World
On June 1, Mexicans voted to overhaul the country’s judicial system. The judicial elections were called to fill 881 positions in the federal judiciary, implementing the plans set forth by a constitutional reform approved in 2024. This is the first judicial election of its kind in Mexican history, and it has redefined the composition of the ministers of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (SCJN), the magistrates of the electoral and circuit courts, and district judges throughout the country.
Until now, Bolivia had been the only country in the world which established the right to elect its highest national ranking judicial officials through a popular vote, a result of its 2009 constitutional referendum during Evo Morales’s first term. In the United States and Switzerland, the judicial election systems are limited to the local level. In most Latin American countries, there are intense debates around the politicization of justice, the democratization of judicial structures, and the use of the law to legitimize political persecution. This is a phenomenon known as “lawfare,” which has been key to explaining the judicialization of conflicts and the persecution of political figures, leaders of social movements, and ideological currents opposed to the regimes in power. Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Argentina are cases in point.
In Mexico, the reform initiative that led to the elections was supported by the ruling government, led by the Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional (Movement for National Regeneration, Morena) who saw it as a bid for democratization in the fight against a corrupt judicial system. To this end, the judicial elections represented a political and legal strategy aimed at reshaping the judicial system at all levels, local and federal. Debates have since raged around the de-professionalization of judicial careers and its impact on the political and economic stability of the country. Amid polarization and disinformation campaigns, the judicial elections were chaotic—characterized by the absence of public financing, rampant disrespect of political parties, and subsequent sanctions. The National Electoral Institute (INE) found that an average of 13 percent of the citizenry (almost 13 million people) went to the polls. This was a very low turnout, especially when compared to the 61 percent turnout achieved in the 2024 national elections.
Ahead of the election, Pablo Uc spoke to José María Soberanes Díez, a jurist with experience at the Supreme Court of Justice and an expert on Mexican constitutional reform. In the following interview, Soberanes critically examines the implementation of the judicial reforms, reflecting on the country’s long-term legal-political process which led to the elections. He surveys the potential scenarios that may arise from the election results—among them, the rising political power of Morena, which seems to have formalized its influence across Mexico’s judicial structure.
An interview with José María Soberanes
PABLO UC: The recent judicial elections have changed the way in which judicial positions in Mexico are filled, transforming the entire structure of the judicial power of the country. What was the political context that gave rise to the judicial reform initiative—approved in September 2024—which led to the June 1 elections?
josé maria soberanes: Discussion around the initiative traces back a long time, mainly as a response to a series of disagreements between the former President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), and the judiciary, in particular the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (SCJN). AMLO pursued a vision of politics that was not very institutional—he went so far as to say “to hell with the institutions”—while the SCJN insisted on institutional guidelines, through which it systematically blocked many of the projects pursued by the executive.
Although AMLO had promoted the idea of reforming the judiciary as part of a political project against corruption, in the early years he held back—the beginning of AMLO’s presidency coincided with the arrival of Arturo Saldívar as head of the SCJN in 2018, with whom he was politically aligned. In fact, Saldívar resigned from the position in 2023 to join Morena, first as part of Claudia Sheinbaum’s campaign and subsequently as general coordinator of policy and government in the presidency. In the latter position, he worked closely with Sheinbaum’s team to become one of the main drivers and designers of the judicial reform.
During AMLO’s administration, the government carried out a minor version of that reform. At the same time, the federal judiciary reached a series of decisions that upset the president. AMLO argued that they were “paralyzing” his large infrastructure projects and works—which had been accused of damaging the environment—as well as the electoral reforms he had promoted in 2023—which the SCJN ruled unconstitutional for failing to follow proper legislative procedures. This confrontational climate intensified, coinciding with the early termination of Saldívar as president of the SCJN and the arrival of Minister Norma Piña to the position. Piña was the first woman to preside over this body and soon became a target of the federal executive.
Faced with rulings that opposed his interests, AMLO considered Plan A to transform the judiciary, a constitutional reform that failed to reach a qualified majority in the Congress of Deputies. Then he attempted Plan B, a set of legal reforms without constitutional reforms, which were challenged by the SCJN. Finally, once he had the necessary legislative majority after the national election of 2024, he went for Plan C, a reform at the constitutional level. This plan seemed difficult to achieve—a constitutional reform in Mexico demands two-thirds approval from the legislative branch. But as a result of the political reorganization following the 2024 national elections, in which Morena won a controversial over-representation in the Chamber of Deputies, the reform easily cleared the benchmark and was approved in less than forty-eight hours. The reform then found approval in the Senate Chamber, thanks to a sudden change in the decision of a senator from an opposing party, and finally by the majority of the state legislatures.
After the speedy approval process, the reform was published on September 15, a non-business day, when the Official Gazette of the Federation is not usually published. It was published with a small nuance—a staggered renewal, so that with the elections of June 2 the SCJN and half of the magistrates and judges would be contested, leaving the other half up for election in 2027.
PU: How did those opposed to the reform react, and what happened once it was approved?
JMS: Once it was confirmed that the reform could move forward, which would replace all positions in the judiciary, the judicial branch announced its decision to go on an indefinite strike in August. There was pressure from the executive regarding the suspension of their pay. The only ones who did not go on strike were the ministers of the SCJN.
After the reform’s approval, there was a debate around whether or not it was possible to challenge it. While the judiciary rarely intervened in matters related to constitutional reforms, there were two options for potential challenges—alleging a constitutional controversy or alleging unconstitutionality. The opposition parties filed an action before the SCJN arguing that the reform was unconstitutional. But there was a problem—the question of whether or not the Constitution could be unconstitutional had never been raised. The SCJN dealt with it very quickly at the beginning of November 2024, but the ruling party had already warned that the SCJN’s resolution would not be heeded.
Thus, the challenge was submitted to a vote: seven justices of the court considered the action of unconstitutionality to be admissible, while four were against it. Since a minimum of eight votes was required for it to succeed, the process concluded at that point and the reform continued unchallenged. Gradually, the courts began to reopen.
After it was clear that the reform would not be ruled unconstitutional, the process of the replacement of judicial branch officials commenced. The Senate drew from a raffle to determine which positions would be voted on in June 1 elections, and which would be voted on in 2027. It was a painful process, and nearly half of the judges and magistrates (1,683 active judges in the country) resigned from their positions, with many arguing that they had obtained their place through professional means rather than popular campaigns. Some resigned immediately, and others decided to wait until the end of August 2025 and abstain from the election process. Eight of the eleven SCJN ministers also resigned.
PU: Once the reform was approved, what were the legal and political procedures that paved the way for the election? Mexican voters were summoned to the polls on June 1. What did they encounter, in an election which had no precedents?
JMS: After the reform was approved, candidates were nominated and selected between October 2024 and February 2025. The three branches of government—legislative, executive, and judicial—formed committees to register and evaluate nominees. Except in the case of the judicial branch committee, in all cases the selection would have considered the minimum requirements for the position and candidates’ professional profile. Based on this, the lists of candidates were sent to the Senate in February 2025.
Once the National Electoral Institute (INE) received the lists, they prepared ballots that were distinct from past elections. Mexican election ballots usually display the logos of political parties, and voters mark the party of their preference. In the case of the ballots for the June 1 election, the names of all the candidates for judges, magistrates, and ministers appeared instead of the political parties.
Each citizen received six ballots with a complete list of candidates, split by gender. For the SCJN election, for example, five women and four men were elected as a principle of gender equity. In this case, a voter needed to list nine numbers from a list of sixty-one names. It was a complicated voting procedure. Given the limited budget of the INE after a historic cutback, the election opted to use voting centers instead of traditional ballot boxes. Votes were counted not by citizens but by INE, and a repeat of a candidate’s number invalidated a ballot. Voter turnout expectations were low, given popular disinterest and little knowledge around those running for office.
PU: How did INE educate citizens about the election process? And what is your read on the judicial candidates’ campaigns, which took place during a short period from March 30 to May 28?
JMS: The INE set up a platform and posted resumes of each candidate for voters to see. But this requires a lot of time for the average citizen—there were hundreds of resumes to examine. The campaigns did not allow private nor public financing—each candidate needed to self-raise. Although the INE did establish a ceiling for personal campaign expenses, there was an oversight that tried to limit or regulate such expenses. In any case, campaigns utilized social media platforms, videos on Tik Tok, and the like. Instead of demonstrating their judicial philosophy or legal project, they sought to be funny and likable. There was limited campaigning around the real issues of the position and the capacities of the candidates to fulfill the role.
PU: What do you see as the main risks of the election, especially when considering the hegemonic role of Morena and the role of interest groups, including organized crime?
JMS: Political parties are the only organizations with a structure capable of mobilizing large numbers of voters on election day. Even before the election, it was already known that political parties were designing and distributing lists for voters to copy on election day. Although I am not certain about this, I think it’s plausible, especially given how party machinery works. I don’t believe these elections would be the exception.
I don’t know anything about organized crime, but it does seem logical to me that these groups have been more interested in influencing this election than the average citizen. Operating in illicit activities makes you more likely to confront the judicial structure. If organized crime or special interests were to finance candidates, it could of course threaten the impartiality of a judge. In general, I believe that the election could weaken judicial independence.
PU: Once the new judiciary is established after this election, what will be the role of a body such as the Judicial Disciplinary Court and the Judicial Administration Body, which will replace the Federal Judiciary Council?
JMS: Until now, the Federal Judiciary Council was in charge of administration and discipline of the judiciary. Now, we will have two separate bodies for each function. With the Judicial Disciplinary Court, any person or authority will be able to denounce officials of the judiciary. But here the risk is that the Judicial Disciplinary Court could sanction judges or magistrates for voting against the political interests of the executive branch. The sanctions, which can range from suspension to dismissal, can condition the impartiality of judges and magistrates and seep into the entire judicial structure. It could affect the highest ranks, because it can sanction the members of the SCJN. The Judicial Disciplinary Court will be composed of five members who were also elected at the ballot box on June 1. It is one of the least discussed institutions, given the importance of the SCJN, but now it is something we are going to question—will the high court of the republic be the Supreme Court or the Judicial Disciplinary Court?
PU: In Mexico and across the region, the critical issues revolve around immigration, security, trade, and human rights. How will the restructuring of the judiciary affect these issues?
JMS: I am worried about what it means for human rights in Mexico. The main guarantee for a victim is the amparo—protection of rights in the Constitution—and the judiciary is responsible for protecting these rights. If the judiciary becomes politicized or loses impartiality, this bears risks on the guarantee of human rights.
For example, a study of Bolivia, which similarly held a popular election for its judiciary, examines sentencing before and after the change of judicial regime. Two general trends were found: first, sentences had become more punitive, i.e., the number of convictions had increased; and second, sentences were more favorable to the state, giving the state the upper hand in a conflict against private parties.
It will now become very difficult to grant an amparo for a human rights violation. I think the amparo is the most important issue in the debate around the reform—the loss of the ability of ordinary citizens to defend themselves against the arbitrariness of the state. Beyond a conservative political perspective, or the particular defense of some judicial authority, or an opposition to anti-corruption changes, this is the issue that worries me the most.
PU: The official results of the election were announced by INE in mid-June. How did you read these results, and what are the main challenges that the new judiciary will face once it takes office in September 2025?
JMS: Let’s consider the complexity of the voting process. There were more invalid votes (10.8 percent of the total votes cast) than those achieved by the candidate who earned the most votes in the election—Hugo Aguilar Ortiz (4.9 percent), the next president of the SCJN—the candidate who earned the second most votes—Lenia Batres Guadarrama (4.7 percent)—combined. In other words, 1 million ballots were annulled, far exceeding the previous record of 5.4 percent in 2009.
The general turnout was very low, between 12.57 percent and 13.32 percent of the total voting population. This was low not only when compared to the presidential election, which always has a higher turnout, but also when compared to the midterms. More than 85 percent of voters decided not to vote.
Why did this occur? There were controversies regarding the profiles of the candidates, but it’s important to recall that this was the responsibility of the three branches of the union, not INE. This is something that could be changed. In some states they are reforming the system so that only the state electoral organization is responsible for a serious and rigorous evaluation.
The challenges to the already elected positions show several inconsistencies. In Veracruz, there was an elected candidate who is currently in prison. INE could not do much, because the lists were already compiled for the ballots. But there are people who should not be candidates, both for their lack of preparation and experience, but also for legal reasons. The other big issue was the use of the lists distributed by political parties in order to encourage citizens to vote for their candidates. This undermines democracy, it prevents a free and secret vote.
When the lists given by the party in power, Morena, completely overlap with the election results, what we see is a “formalization” of a previous selection. It seems that the results were already known beforehand—candidates associated with the political party in power that promoted and approved the reform won. This was not a citizens’ election, it was a partisan election, and this is worrisome.
The immediate judicial scenario, so far, has been frivolous. There have been no transformative, substantive agendas put forward. Instead, the changes have been at the surface-level, such as eliminating the mandatory use of robes by the judges of the SCJN, and opting instead for traditional indigenous costumes as an expression of multicultural inclusion. The new members of the SCJN will soon have to define the value of legal precedents and the SCJN’s decisions of the past 100 years. Perhaps they resort to a jurisprudence that omits the weight of precedents considered a criteria of a favored social class, and they instead elect to start from scratch. But starting from scratch could leave the country without a legal compass. The first sentences of this upcoming September will determine the value that the magistrates will give to jurisdictional precedent and, in turn, the future of the new judiciary.
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