Jungles in Dispute

The Amazon rainforest is one of the most sensitive ecosystems in the world, as its deforestation could trigger a chain reaction leading to a warmer and more unstable global climate. Preserving the Amazon has become a top priority for both climate finance and the countries that share this ecosystem, including Colombia. This year’s Climate Summit will be held in the Amazon itself, in Belém, Pará.

Upon winning the Colombian presidency, Gustavo Petro promised to reduce deforestation. The Colombian Amazon—which represents 35 percent of Colombia’s territory—is the region of the country in which deforestation is most prevalent. This phenomenon is driven by cattle ranching, illegal logging, and drug trafficking, the latter led by armed guerrilla groups that did not sign the 2016 Peace Agreement and now control illegal cross-border trade in the rainforest.

Under Petro, the task of controlling deforestation in the Amazon fell to Susana Muhamad, Minister of Environment from 2022 until February 2025. Muhamad, the daughter of Palestinian immigrants, had been an ally of Petro since his tenure as the mayor of Bogotá. As head of the environment ministry, she sought to move forward Colombia’s green transition project and weaken the country’s dependence on fossil fuels.

At the end of last year, Muhamad left her post amid disagreement with the Petro administration over the entry of more centrist politicians, including those accused of corruption, in the presidential cabinet. Nonetheless, she has continued to defend her links to the Colombian president’s program and was considered for the position of head of the government’s National Planning Department this month, although she ultimately failed to secure an appointment. Her leadership in the Biodiversity Summit held in Cali (2024) and the results in the fight she led against Amazon deforestation made her a key player in Petro’s environmental program.

For Phenomenal World, Muhamad spoke with Camilo Andrés Garzón about her strategy to fight deforestation, negotiating with armed groups, and financing Amazonian protection at a time when resources coming through USAID and the United States have been severely restricted.

An interview with Susana Muhamad

Camilo Andrés Garzón: Colombia—which accounts for 6 percent of the Amazonian ecosystem—receives a X in aid for preservation. The Ministry of Environment was tasked with the objective of reducing deforestation. How did the national government measure up to this goal?

Susana Muhamad: The reduction figures are historic. We achieved the lowest deforestation figures thus far in the twenty-first century. The highest point of deforestation was in 2017, when 219,000 hectares of forest land were removed. This was right after the signing of the government’s peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas. As FARC lost control over land and thus a role as a de facto environmental authority, they left territory open for uncontrolled deforestation.

Under the right-wing government of Iván Duque, deforestation was at 174,000 hectares in 2021. Petro managed to reduce it to 125,000 in 2022. By 2023, it was the lowest in the century, at 79,000 hectares. In 2024, deforestation rose again to 107,000. This shows that deforestation requires the persistent efforts of the state. It is an unstable political goal, and deforestation cannot be easily reversed.

We put an end to Operation Artemisa, the militaristic approach to deforestation led by the right-wing Uribist government of Iván Duque. Without the threat of military persecution, we were able to regain the confidence of farmers in these departments, who used to view the state with suspicion because of its repressive role. The arrival of Petro’s government created the opportunity to change the relationship between the state and the communities.

We engaged in dialogue with farmers in the Amazonian departments (where most of the deforestation occurs) to understand where they were and how they organized themselves socially and politically. This helped us create a program with them that would respond to the realities in those territories. They had criticisms of previous conservation programs, including those led by NGOs and international cooperation initiatives.

On this basis, we built a political pact with farmers. The government committed substantial economic resources to meet its responsibilities to this pact, and thus the state became the main financier of conservation efforts. Through the Conservar Paga program, the government grants the farmers in the Amazon rainforest 900,000 pesos per month ($216) as an incentive for reforestation activities. International initiatives used to be the main financiers and defined how the programs that were in place operated. Now, these organizations and initiatives are following the lead of the Colombian government.

We’ve bet on a productive model that demonstrates the possibility of a different kind of economy that regenerates the forest, instead of one based on cattle ranching. This agreement is aligned with the peace processes of the Petro government, so the state also held talks with the armed actors of the territory, such as FARC dissidents, to include them in the conversation about containing deforestation.

In addition to negotiating with communities and FARC dissidents, the government’s plan replaces Operation Artemisa with criminal investigation to directly capture large deforesters, who are often linked to local politicians and ranchers, instead of small farmers who deforest for subsistence. We also altered land legislation, so that farmers can use the land for reforestation with legal security, and aren’t prohibited from intervening in environmentally sensitive areas. This whole package of measures has together led to the reduction of deforestation. If we can maintain this progress for the next ten or fifteen years, we can show that there is a regional economic model in the Amazon that can regenerate the forest.

CG: You believe that this model of reforestation with government support can be an alternative to the livestock economy, which has encouraged Amazon deforestation in Colombia.

SM: I think we are beginning to show how this economic model would work, but we need to consolidate these markets for Amazonian products and demonstrate production. This is very difficult because it is estimated that extensive cattle ranching and land grabbing invested 5 trillion pesos (more than $1 billion) in the Amazonian economy in five years. The Petro government has invested 1 trillion pesos ($250 million) in the region in two and a half years, and the money has already run out. There are guaranteed resources until 2026, but with the national budget crisis it is difficult to guarantee the objective of investing 600 billion pesos annually, as the president had wanted.

CG: You said that the government engaged in talks with the armed FARC dissidents as part of the effort to contain deforestation. But since the peace negotiation with these groups failed to materialize, FARC dissidents have begun to relax measures and allow deforestation in the Amazon as a way of pressuring the government. How do you reflect on the decision to include armed groups in the negotiation?

SM: Without the support of the local population, an armed group cannot control the territory, so they rely on threats and extortion. The Ministry of Environment and the other environmental institutions are not intimidated by the armed actors, and we persist in being present and engaged with farming communities. We’ve had officials threatened by armed groups, and the environmental institutions have been the government’s political resistance to the armed actors.

I believe that if peasants regain confidence in the state as an ally that helps them and includes them in a productive model, these armed actors will be isolated from the political will of the people. There is a very serious public-popular alliance that delegitimizes armed groups. I am concerned that negotiating with FARC dissidents gave some oxygen to these groups—which are dedicated mainly to drug trafficking and taxing farmers—and facilitated their expansion. Sadly, we know that the areas where there is now a ceasefire and partial agreements with these groups is where the most deforestation is taking place. In other words, the agreements with the guerrillas have not been useful for the fulfillment of environmental achievements.

I am not saying no to the peace tables. What I believe is that the action of the State in the Amazonian departments cannot be subordinated only to what happens in those tables, because the State has a constitutional function to work with the communities that cannot be stopped because the peace table does not advance. We cannot run the risk of allowing the armed actors to use the negotiating tables to advance their political-economic ends.

CG: Brazil controls 60 percent of the Amazon rainforest. Lula Da Silva’s government reduced deforestation by nearly 50 percent between 2022 and 2024. What does the Brazilian case suggest for the fight against deforestation? What makes the Colombian case different from Brazil’s?

SM: The deforestation factors in the countries are different. In Colombia, the Amazon is the most conserved area of the country, while in Brazil, a region like Pará, which is part of the Amazon biome, is a massive industrial area.

The Brazilian government did tell us about the importance of satellite monitoring systems in tracking deforestation. Here in Colombia, the last three governments have been developing a forest and carbon monitoring system with the help of international cooperation. This is key for following up on deforestation efforts. As minister, I sat down once a week to look at the images produced by this tool. Almost immediately we could see where deforestation was taking place, allowing us to come to the negotiating table with evidence against the claims of dissidents who claimed they were protecting the forest. We can also see if farming communities are complying, property by property, with the forest protection goals, in order to pay them the economic incentive.

We want to improve the monitoring system to help us prosecute large deforesters. We’ve created the National Council Against Deforestation and Environmental Crimes for that purpose, financed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Thanks to this program, we were able to identify the Corponariño case, where eleven officials of an environmental protection institution were linked to deforestation and other illegal activities.

Brazil’s military and judicial operations are gigantic. In Colombia, we have not reached that capacity. The Colombian case is also more complex for the reasons of the armed conflict. Still, we should remember that the mafias operating in the Amazon are transnational and require binational operations. We are cooperating with the Brazilian government on this front. The Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) must work more rigorously to carry out criminal investigations at the scale of the Amazon biome, precisely because the pressures and drivers of deforestation are not restricted to a single nation.

CG: Another of the Ministry’s commitments was to ensure resources for Amazon protection. In 2024, Petro created the Fund for Life, the largest fund for environmental policies in Colombia’s history. This at a time when the Trump administration has cut funding intended for Amazon protection. 

SM: The US provided resources through their own agencies, such as USAID, to implement their projects. The Fund for Life collects from different sources, including the national budget, a carbon tax, and an illicit crop substitution program. These are funds from the state itself. While the Fund still allows money to come directly from international aid, we can depend less on it. There is already an agreement with the World Bank to fund the program. This strengthens the public sector and not only the NGOs.

Cooperation for Amazon protection traditionally works through agreements made at climate summits for large funds, but these funds are implemented almost exclusively by global certified agencies. These agencies define the programs that are then presented to different environmental ministries in need of resources. But where is sovereignty and territorial governance? No wonder local communities say: what I see is vests of all colors and flags here, but without any unity.

Previously, the law mandated that environmental funding be distributed annually and only to international institutions such as regional corporations. But these were very small projects without long-term impacts. Given its scale, the Fund for Life can invest in larger programs that can work with more actors. For example, we are giving money to the Community Action Boards, which are citizens’ organizations in the Amazon. This is a financial revolution in terms of who receives the resources. Today, with the Fund for Life, we have the largest Amazon program of any cooperation institution or NGO.

CG: This is happening at a time when carbon credits have become more relevant in climate COPs as an option for companies and states to reduce their emissions, and at the same time finance the care of the forest. What is your reading of the carbon credit market for conservation purposes in the Amazon?

SM: The carbon market has two scenarios: the regulated market and the unregulated market. The regulated market is between states, and to me, it’s a mechanism that could work. For example, I make an agreement with Japan and tell them: locate your industry in Colombia, my energy matrix has fewer emissions, and you can collect those certificates. It is a good investment for Colombia because it will generate employment and technology transfers. It is good for Japan because its products will have lower emissions. This is what we finally regulated at the COP29 in Azerbaijan last year, where Colombia was very active in promoting environmental safeguards.

On the other hand, the unregulated market, which is between private parties, has serious problems due to scandals around projects with indigenous communities where financial speculators have profited.

There are still no regulations to prevent this, and I was unable to propose a regulation during my time as minister. But I hope it can see the light of day under this government. The unregulated market has been benefitting some certifying and intermediary companies, but it does not seem to me that this is of public benefit. For example, a global airline company that wants to reduce its emissions can through intermediary carbon credits that it formulated in Colombia with some projects. But that intermediary which is earning has no social responsibility within the territory. As the market currently stands, the state only registers the projects in progress or those that are planned, and it functions as a notary. The idea for a regulation would be to control projects and guarantee that they meet environmental and social safeguards. It is not really a mechanism to reduce emissions, nor is it a mechanism that will solve the problem of climate change. It is a form of financing and that is how it should be seen.

A more attractive alternative is a domestic carbon market in Colombia that already exists, where domestic companies can reduce a portion of their carbon tax by investing in forest restoration projects. The Fund for Life can be used by companies to invest in projects that have national relevance.

CG: This is a challenging moment for the Latin American left. Part of the progressive electorate is very environmentally sensitive and connects with the decarbonization agenda. Another part is rooted in the historical struggles of trade union movements in the oil and gas sectors. How can we mediate these seemingly competing interests?

SM: This is a global debate, and this is why we speak of a just energy transition. “Just” has many connotations. One is the question of who is responsible for climate injustice. It is excellent that oil workers have guaranteed labor rights, but what are the impacts on the people most vulnerable to climate change as the result of an unsustainable industry.

It’s not true that the oil industry generates more jobs. It is a truly capital-intensive industry, but it is not labor-intensive. The renewable energy industry generates seven times more jobs per energy unit produced, as compared to the oil industry, because it requires a process of industrialization. The solar panel production chain, for example, goes from the process of extracting materials to commissioning and includes the panel maintenance industry.

The important question is how to transition these jobs. An example of this is in the department of Cesar, where the closure of Prodeco, a coal mining company, caused a major unemployment problem. But now they are migrating to become owners of solar energy.

The same is taking place with the Wayuu indigenous communities in La Guajira: the alternative is between whether it is going to be another territory of extractivism, even with renewable energies such as wind energy, or whether indigenous communities, in their ancestral territory, will be partners in these new energies.

Obviously, if there is no just transition, there will be no transition. What there will be is a popular movement that will attack environmentalism, and that is a deadly trap for the left. It is precisely progressivism in its understanding of the social and environmental dimension that must propose the policies for the green transition to provide better opportunities. This is a slow process, but this government is hoping that the extractive industries weigh less in the national GDP compared to the income that can be generated by tourism, for example, which produces more jobs, or agriculture, which also needs to move toward agro-industry. Without reindustrialization, we’ll just replace the current extractivism.

The current energy transition could also end up embracing extractivism under another name. We can easily play the role of mineral exporters for the transition, and then buy state-of-the-art technology and remain in debt, which is the economic model of oil and mining extractivism over the last thirty years. The alternative must be decarbonized economic activities that generate employment and industry.

This contradiction you mention seems to me to be less a problem for the left and more so a problem for the liberals. The liberals think that the energy transition is a technological one, not one of production power, and that those are two very different tasks. The liberals in France can remove the gasoline subsidy for environmental reasons and spark the yellow jackets movement, which now has right-wing implications. The European Union places environmental measures on agricultural production and leads to a movement of farmers against it. All of this is because the liberals are not consulting the social reality from where they craft neoliberal green policy. The green policies of the European Union have encouraged right-wing populism.

The left should lead the proposal for a just transition. The alternative is leaving the field open to a radical extractivist right wing, reflected in Trump’s announcement to enable the timber industry to use 100 million hectares of public lands where there are native forests for timber extraction and export. That’s about the same size in Colombia.

CG: The recently televised Council of Ministers meeting reflected a division in the government cabinet, as you objected to the president’s proximity to politicians accused of corruption like Armando Benedetti, who is Minister of the Interior. Looking ahead to the 2026 elections, this raises the question of whether or not Petro will form alliances with the center.

SM: The reality today is that it is impossible to govern and win without alliances. If you look at the voting trends, there is no majority force anywhere, so we have to form a coalition. The question is the terms of the coalition. When Petro came to power in 2022, the heart of the coalition was his progressivism. In hundreds of public squares across the country, he delivered speeches on his principles, values, and political programs that would fight against corruption and mafias in the state.

Of course, gaining power required alliances, but these alliances were dominated by a progressive faction. Other agendas were included and there was some power sharing across the coalition, especially if allies’ support would help ease the way in Congress to pass the reforms, but this did not happen that often. For me and some other ministers in the Council of Ministers, we questioned what values were dominating the governing coalition, and we insisted on remembering why we came to power.

Now, looking towards 2026, who will be the center of the coalition without Petro? Those of the political center know that they need progressivism, and progressivism needs the center. We could see a scenario like 2014, in which progressive factions supported Juan Manuel Santos because he defended the peace process.

At that time, despite the thousand differences we had on economic policy, we decided to vote for Santos to support the agreement, but we were in the margins of the coalition. Now, in 2026, the progressive faction must maintain significant weight in any coalition, even if we do not dominate or if the candidate does not come from the progressive movement.

Still, we need to fight for results that will grant momentum to next year’s campaign, advocating for specific progressive policies like agrarian reforms and those supporting the energy transition. These policies must increase employment and reduce poverty. That must be the progressive agenda for next year.