This is an archived version of the PW Sources newsletter from Saturday, July 15. Sign up to receive PW Sources directly to your inbox here.

DUTCH IMMIGRATION

The Dutch coalition government collapsed last week, with Prime Minister Mark Rutte resigning after centrist coalition members refused to support highly restrictive policies for refugees. 

In a 2020 chapter, RINUS PENNINX charts the history of post-war labor immigration in the Netherlands. 

From the text:

“By the end of the 1950s, the country’s postwar economic reconstruction was so successful that labour reserves decreased significantly and, in labour-intensive industries (metallurgy, food and textile industries and mining), it was difficult to find sufficient workers. From 1961, a state-organized official recruitment drive started to fill vacancies, mainly with un- or low- skilled workers. First came Italians, then Spaniards, Portuguese, Greeks and Yugoslavs; still later came Turks, Moroccans, Tunisians, and Algerians. Between 1961 and 1975, some 85,000 migrant workers were officially recruited until the drive was ended. However, many more came. Immigration Policy was dominated by the belief that foreign workers’ engagement was only temporary—which is why they were popularly called gastarbeiders (guestworkers). Initially (1960–1967) they were seen as a buffer for industrial sectors being restructured and for general fluctuations in economic activity. As a result of the brief economic recession in 1966/7, the concept of the foreign worker acting as a buffer receded but the temporary nature of ‘guestwork’ remained a basic policy premise. ‘The Netherlands is not an immigration country’ was the crucial sentence in the Memorandum on Foreign Workers of 1970. The government maintained that ‘guestwork’ would become redundant when the restructuring process was complete. During the boom years of recruitment (1969–1971), however, the stricter regulation of  admission proved to have little effect on the actual inflow of recruited workers. The increasing demand for labour made foreign workers indispensable until the economic crisis of 1973.” 

+  “The Dutch government not only tried to prevent migration to the Netherlands; it also took measures to introduce settled immigrants to return. Even more ambitious was the idea of stimulating return migration by development programs for regions in the sending societies that were heavily dependent on migrant labor.” By Hans Van Amersfoort and Penninx. Link. 

+  “Despite the fact that the Dutch job machine has been churning out jobs at a very high rate almost continually in the 1990s, unemployment among immigrants has remained relatively high.” By Robert Kloosterman, Joanne Van Der Leun, and Jan Rath. Link. 

+  Aslan Zorlu and Joop Hartog on guest workers and “skilled” labor in the Dutch economy. Link. 

NEW RESEARCHERS

Climate change denial

EDGARD DEWITTE is a PhD candidate in economics at SciencesPo Paris. In a recent paper, he explores the link between fossil fuel identities and beliefs around climate change.

From the abstract: 

“Almost half of U.S. citizens doubt the reality of human-made climate change, and this share has remained stable over the last three decades. This paper argues that the roots of this denial are, in part, to be found in the economic histories of communities. Using data on 3.6 million oil and gas wells drilled between 1859 and 2022, I show that long-term exposure to fossil fuel extraction negatively impacts present levels of climate change beliefs—independent of present production and employment. These effects are neither driven by ideological bundling of beliefs, nor by selective migration. Instead, building on archival and, in particular, historical local newspapers data, I document the development of persistent fossil fuel identities in communities linked to their extraction, and show how they interacted with the formation of beliefs.”

+ + +

+  “As cash-rich institutions, multinational corporations are concerned not so much with access to funding but with obstacles posed by foreign exchange fluctuations, cash flows, and supply chain disruptions.” New on PW, Elham Saeidinezhad on the global payments system and the end of LIBOR. Link.

+  “It’s more comfortable and politically convenient to continue to fight the culture war over higher education than to confront the facts about the causes and consequences of this ugly mountain of student debt.” In the New York Times, JFI’s Laura Beamer and Marshall Steinbaum on the student debt crisis. Link. And link to JFI’s report on the student loan repayment pause. 

+  The thirtieth anniversary special issue of the Review of International Political Economy, featuring articles on gendered finance, Chinese high-speed rail, and company colonies, and more. Link. 

+  “Honduras’ powerful elite families enjoy enormous tax privileges, and they have stridently opposed the introduction of progressive taxes.” By Sammy Castro. Link. 

+  Ritu Dewan, Jashodhara Dasgupta, Sona Mitra, and Sruthi Kutty sketch out a feminist fiscal policy for India. Link.

+  “Firms that used the Double Irish redirected $59 billion in royalty payments to the United States in 2020, the first year of full closure.” By Navodhya Samarakoon. Link. 

+  Chiara Colesanti Senni, Maria Sole Pagliari, and Jens van‘t Klooster
on the climate footprint of the European Central Bank’s Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations program. Link.

+  Saerom Han on “precarious workers’ collective actions” in Tunisia. Link.

+  José Antonio Vega Araújo, Miquel Muñoz Cabré, Reinaldo Lerma, and Yismary Ramirez on “the social acceptance of wind energy among Indigenous Wayuu communities” in Colombia. Link.

+  “From about the ninth century on, a geniza room was located in a synagogue in Fustat (old Cairo), where for centuries tens of thousands of documents were deposited. The room and its contents were eventually forgotten until the end of the last century, when the treasure was rediscovered. The geniza contains more than one thousand documents which reflect the eleventh-century Mediterranean trade. These documents depict this trade as free, private, and competitive. The authorities’ stance with respect to international trade reflected the tolerance and liberalism that characterized the period. Muslim rulers, especially the Fatimids (who ruled North Africa, Sicily, Egypt, and Palestine), sought to promote trade and no official restrictions fettered migration or the transfer of raw materials, finished goods, or money across the Mediterranean. Both transportation and mail delivery were competitive and largely private, and shipping was available even to a small merchant, who could rent storage space on a ship. The trade within each trade center was free and competitive, with many buyers and sellers interacting in bazaars and storehouses, where they negotiated and competed over prices, using brokers, open-bid auctions, and direct negotiation.” By Avner Greif. Link. 

Each week we highlight research from a graduate student, postdoc, or early-career professor. Send us recommendations: editorial@jainfamilyinstitute.org